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The probability of survival of a communication network
is defined as the probability that there exist at least one
path between any pair of stations within the network. In
this thesis, four methods for the calculation of the proba-
bility of survival of the network, which is under enemy
attack, are presented.
The first two methods deal with random networks whose
links have finite and identical probability of survival,
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I. INTRODUCTION
A communication network is a set of nodes connected by
links. Every link has a branch capacity which indicates the
maximum amount of flow of messages. A communication network
must have large enough branch capacity such that all messages
can reach their destinations under specified conditions. In
general these message requirements vary with time.
A communication network may be considered as a collection
of message centers that attempt to transfer information to one
another over a variety of connecting channels. However, nei-
ther the centers nor the channels are necessarily survivable
at any given time. For example in military applications a
center might be destroyed by enemy attack, or lose its power
supply. Likewise, a communication channel might be busy, or
it might be inoperative because of an amplifier failure, a
broken or cut telephone wire, or a jammed radio link. In spite
of these possibilities, it is highly desirable that the re-
maining switching centers be able to communicate with each
other
.
A reasonable definition of survivability of a communication
network is that there be at least one path between any pair of
stations. The survivability of a military communication net-
work is related to the exact structure of the network and the
probability of survival of its links. It is also related to
the enemy attack and the topology of the network.

If one wants to enhance the probability of survival of
the network, he might increase the probability of survival
of the links, or he might increase the number of links between
pairs of stations without increasing the total probabilities
of survival of the links or he might change the topology of
the network or use some combinations of these techniques.
The choice of techniques depends heavily on the cost of the
network
.
Communication links are made up of one or more elements
such as cables, antennas, repeaters, or buildings which house
the communication equipment.
The analysis of the survivability of the communication
networks has been studied by various investigators [5 ] , [6],
[8] and [11]. In the work of E. Moore and C. Shannon [8],
the probability of communication between given pair (x,y) of
nodes in the network is Investigated. In reference 5, the
idea of the overall survivability of the finite communication
network is introduced. Two formulas are given for calculating
the overall probability of survival.
In this paper, random networks and finite networks whose
links have a finite probability of survival under nuclear
weapon attacks are considered. Four methods are given to cal-
culate the probability of survival of the communication network
First two methods apply to the random networks; one of them is
without the consideration of the length of the path between
any pair of stations. The probability of survival of the
finite networks are calculated by approximation methods using

the min-cut theorem. Last method gives accurate results for
finite networks and is computationally feasible for networks
with several thousand stations or nodes.
A. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
A communication network has n stations (or nodes) desig-
nated by v, 3 ...,v . which are connected by links. Every
station has an average of s number of links and no self loops.
Also, all links are assumed identical with equal probability
of survival.
A communication network might have fixed topological
structure such as a microwave relay system, or might have
time varying structure such as a nonsynchronous satellite com-
munication network.
The stations are assumed to have high probability of
survival. In this model of a communication network, the prob-
ability of survival is assumed to be unity.
The probability of survival of a link is related to the
distance between a pair of links and the structure of the
link. Also assumed is the separation between links of a net-
work be ensured that one weapon will not destroy more than a
predetermined number of links.
If the enemy wants to destroy a system, he can organize
his attack in one of many ways. He can aim his weapons at
all its series links, or he can aim at any portion of the net-
work. The choice of his attack depends on probable location
of the links, the degree of importance of the links, and
energy level of his weapons, etc.

The following condition is assumed for enemy attack.
The nuclear weapon is aimed at random into a region of area
A. The probability that any given nuclear weapon is aimed at
a region of area A is A/ A (A<A).
A nuclear weapon has many effects. In this thesis, the
destructive effect is mentioned, which is due mainly to blast
or shock damages to structures either through the crushing
action of the peak overpressure, or through the lateral dis-
placement, tumbling or tearing apart caused by the dynamic
pressures. Also, the damage caused by a nuclear weapon is
classified by degree as follows: [2]
Type A: Completely destroyed.
Type B: Damage severely and beyond repair.
Type C: Damage that requires major repairs.
Type D: Light damage.
The schematic illustration of distribution of the types of
damages is shown in Fig. 1.
The average radius of damage is assumed to be R. Inside
R-,
,
every link is completely destroyed and there is no damage
outside the radius R
?
when nuclear explosion occurs at point
(0,0). Thus, some links will not be destroyed and some links
only partially destroyed, when the links are located between
the radii R-, and R
?
. In this paper, it will be assumed that
the probability of damage of links located between radii R-,




The diagram of distribution of the types of damages

II. SURVIVABILITY OF A LINK UNDER NUCLEAR WEAPON ATTACK
When a nuclear weapon falls near a target at a distance
less than the damage radius R-. from a link, the link is al-
ways totally destroyed. However the network may still main-
tain communications.
If the distance between a pair of links is 2r miles and
r is less than the damage radius R-. for the nuclear weapon
used by the enemy, the links may have high probability of dam-
age or low probability of survival. The distance 2r must be
at least twice the damage radius R~ of the nuclear weapon in
order to get a high probability of survival. This radius R ?
is a function of the yield of the nuclear weapon. If someone
wants to design a communication network, he must estimate the
size of the largest weapon of the enemy. For instance, If
the explosion occurs above the surface of the ground or water,
a 1 MT. nuclear weapon has a damage radius of about 10.5
miles and 20 MT . nuclear weapon has a 27 mile damage radius
[2].
With the aid of a computer, the integration of the prob-
ability function over a known damage radius of the various MT
.
weapon is shown in Fig. 2. If a link is sufficiently distant
from a given MT . explosion and the distance r lies well to
the right of the applicable MT . curve in Fig. 2, the survival
of that link is almost certain. If, on the other hand, the
distance r lies to the left of the applicable curve, the de-
struction of the link is almost certain.
10

The probability of survival given by Fig. 2 is the prob-
ability that one nuclear weapon falls specified distance away
from the link. If more than one nuclear weapon is aimed at
different points of the communication network, the probability
of survival of the link is the product of the probability of
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P(N) = p,(x ) p (x ) ... pM (x. T )l v 1' ^2 V 2 N V ~N (1)
where P(N) is the total probability of survival of the link
under N nuclear weapon attacks. x, is the distance from the
zero point of the k nuclear weapon. p, (x, ) is the prob-
ability of survival as given in Fig. 2 for distance x, at
various energy levels of the weapon.
If the link is sufficiently far from the zero points of
each weapon such that x, lies well to the right of the associ-
ated curve for a given weapon, p, (x, ) is very close to unity
and considerably greater than 0.99- If> for example, the
number of nuclear weapons were 10, P(10) would still be 0.9.
Thus, the value of P(10) is still near 1.0. Therefore, if
the distance between zero points of each weapon and the link
is far enough, the number of the nuclear weapons does not in-
fluence the probability of survival of the link.
EXAMPLE 1: Let three 5-MT. nuclear weapons be aimed at
some area. The distance from the zero points to the link are
12, 15 and 18 miles respectively. What is the probability of
survival of the link?
According to equation (i)
P(3) w
k=l








From Fig. 2 for a 5 MT. nuclear weapon
P]L (12) = 0.09




So, the probability of survival of a link is 0.08.
In practice, it is too difficult to estimate or measure
the distance between links and the zero points of each weapon
for which the probability of survival of a link is computed.
However, a communication network should always have more
than one link and also the nuclear weapon can destroy more
than one link.
Assuming 2r to be the average distance between each pair
of links, we may now compute the average probability of sur-
vival of a link which is integrating over the area of radius
r. Then,
r
p(r) = / f(x) dx (2)
where f(x) is the Gaussian distribution function of surviv-
ability with mean and variance, and 2r Is the average distance
between links in miles.
When the communication network is subjected to random
bombardment, the probability of survival of a link is a func-
tion of the average distance between links, but it is indepen-
dent of its location. However, for one nuclear weapon, the
probability of survival of a link is related to the ratio of
the damage area of the nuclear weapon to the area which is
subjected to random bombardment.
13

Various energy level nuclear weapons have different
damage areas and different means and variances. Every various
energy level nuclear weapon has a different damage distribu-
tion of probability.
The nuclear weapon is targeted at random into a region of
area A square miles. The probability of a link being inside
the damage area of the nuclear weapon is the ratio of the
damage area of the nuclear weapon to an area which is sub-
jected to random bombardment. Thus,
j ( D < A )
2
where D is the damage area and equal to ttR„ , R„ is the damage
radius of the nuclear weapon.
The probability of damage of any given link which is in-
side this area is
Q = £[ 1 - P(r) ]
where l-p(r) is the probability of damage of a link which is
2r miles from other link or r miles from the zero point.
The probability of survival of any given link inside the
area of A square miles is
P = 1 - Q (3)
Equation (3) is valid for one nuclear weapon. If N nuclear
weapons fall at random in an area of A square miles, the fol-
lowing is valid:




EXAMPLE 2: Let 30 miles be the average distance between
links. Three 5 MT . nuclear weapons are randomly aimed at an
area of 1000 square miles. What is the probability of sur-
vival of any given link in this area?
The probability of survival of a link which is 15 miles
from the zero point is
p(15) = 0.90
The damage radius of the 5 MT . nuclear weapon is 17 miles.
Therefore, the damage area, D, is 907. 5 square miles.
The probability of a link being in damage area, D, is
j = 0.9075
For one nuclear weapon, the probability of survival of
any given link in area of A square miles is
P(l) = 0.989
For three nuclear weapons;
P(3) = 0.967
If the average distance between links Is large enough,
the number of nuclear weapons does not appreciable affect the
probability of survival of the links.
If the average distance between a pair of links is 24
miles vice 30 miles, the probability of survival of any given
link is changed drastically. Thus, from Fig. 2
p(12) = 0.10
The probability of any given link inside the damage area
is unchanged and again equal to 0.9075-
15

For one nuclear weapon, the probability of survival of a
link in same area of 1000 square miles is
P(l) = 0.183
For three nuclear weapons
P(3) = 0.0043
From the above examples, the average distance between
links is the most critical factor, since it was shown that a
change of only 6 miles or 20 percent resulted in a significant
difference in the probability of survival varied from 98.9




Let a communication network be an aggregate of stations
and each station is capable of issuing some number s of links.
Each link terminates at some station of the aggregate, and the
probability that a link from one station terminates at another
station is the same for every pair of stations. The resulting
configuration is called "random communication network" [6].
A. THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THE LENGTH OF THE PATH
In the last chapter, the probability of survival of any
given link inside some area of A square miles is considered
under various conditions based on the size of the enemy weapons
and the distance between pairs of links.
The average number of links, s, alone cannot give precise
information about the communication network survivability. In
addition, the relationship between the average number of links
and the probability of survival of the communication network
is needed to determine the survivability of the network.
Markoff chains can be used to find the probability of sur-
vival of the random communication network. Suppose that an urn
contains n balls with w white balls and n-w black balls and a
player has s tickets. He plays one ticket for the right to
draw a ball at random from the urn. If the ball drawn is
white, he receives d additional tickets and if it is black he
receives nothing. The ball drawn is always replaced by a
black ball. Drawings continue until s=0. In this case, black
17

balls represent stations not reached previously, and tickets
represent the number of links emanating from previously
reached stations, which have not yet been traced.
Let H be the probability of survival of the communication
network which is a function of the number of links.
H = f(s) (5)
The average number of links after the enemy attack can be
calculated as follows: Let d be the average number of links,
after the enemy attack, d is equal to the average number of
links before the enemy attack times the probability of sur-
vival of any given link inside some area of A square miles.
Thus
d = s P(N) (6)
where P(N) is the probability of survival of any given link
inside some area of A square miles and s is the average number
of links before the enemy attack.
The urn problem can also be applied to our random communica-
tion network. The existence of a path in a random communica-
tion network from a station v. to a station v. implies the
possibility of tracing links from v. through any number of
intermediate stations to v..
J
v. is m links removed from v., if m is the smallest number
o f links contained in any of the paths from v. to v.. StationJ F 1.1
v. itself is zero link removed from v.. All the other stations
l l
upon which the links of v. terminate are one link removed. The
stations upon which the links from these latter stations
18

terminate, and which are not one or zero links removed, are
two links removed, etc., according to' Ref. 6.
Let C(m) be the probability that a given station is con
tacted at the m stage. The probability that a station is
contacted for the first time at the m stage is
m-1
C(m) [ 1 - C(i) ] (7)
1=0
Let B(m) = 1 - C(m), Eq. 7 becomes
m-1
[ 1 - B(m) ] B(i) (7. a)
1=0
where B(0) is the probability of not selecting a given station
at stage zero.
The average number of links emanating from a station that
has survived is d. Since each station sends on the average
d links, and there are n stations in the communication net-





X d n [ 1 - B(m)
i=0
The probability that any given station in the aggregate
is not contacted by any of these links on the (m+1) tracing
will then be
B(m+1) = ( 1 - 1/n )










B(i) - B(i) ]}
i=0 1 =
Taking the product of both sides of Eq. 10 with respect
to rn, yields
m+1 m j-1 j
B(i) ]} (11)B(j) = Exp{-d [ B(i)
j=i 3=1 1=0 1=0




B(j) = 1 - H (12)
3=1








Inside the braces is
-d[B(0) - B(0) B(l) + B(0) B(l) - ••• + B(0) B(l) ••• B(m-l)









But B(0 )=l-l/n-l. as n goes to infinity and Eq. 13. a becomes
m
Exp(-d [ 1 - B(i) ]} CU)
i=0
Taking the limit of Eq. 14, as m approaches infinity
Exp{-d [ 1- (1 - II)}] = Exp (-d H) (15)
Equation 12 equals Eq . 15 under these conditions, Thus,
1 - H = Exp (-d H) or
H = 1 - Exp (-d H)
Substituting Eq. 6 into Eq. 16 yields
R = 1 - Exp [ -s P(N) H ]
(16)
(17)
Equation 17 is an equation for the probability of survival
of the communication network after the enemy attack in terms
of the network parameters.
We note that for H=0, every d is the solution of the Eq.
16 . If HYO then Eq . 16 can be solved explicitly for a given




The right-hand side of Eq . 18 is analytic in every neigh-
borhood of the origin and tends toward unity as H goes to
zero. Expanding that function in power series of H, we have
r 2




Negative values of H, being physically meaningless, must





























d - Number of Links after Attack
Figure 3
The average number of links d is always an integer. So the
value of d equals zero which is physically meaningless.
An examination of the meaningful part of Fig. 3 shows
that as long as the number of links does not exceed one link
per station H = 0, i.e., for a very large n, the number of sta-
tions to which there exist paths from an arbitrary station is
negligible compared to the total number of stations in the
communication network. On the other hand, as the average num-
ber of links increases from unity, H increases rather rapidly.
For d=2, H reaches about 0.80 of its asymptotic value and is
within a fraction of one percent of unity for a quite moderate
value of d (say 6)
.
This means that no matter how large the communication net-
work is, it is nearly certain that there will exist a path
22

between two stations picked at random, provided only the
average number of links is a few times greater than unity.
EXAMPLE 3: Let 24 miles be the average distance between
links. Three 5 MT . nuclear weapons are randomly aimed at an
area of 3000 square miles. What is the average number of
links per station before the enemy attack in order to keep 80
percent survivability of the communication network?
Then, from Pig. 2, for r=12 miles and 5 MT . nuclear weapon
p(12) = 0.09
The probability of a link being in the damage area, D, is
j = 0.3025
The probability of survival of any given link inside area
is
P(D = 0.73
Then, the probability of survival, for three 5 MT . nuclear
weapons is
P(3) = 0.39




s must be an integer. It is chosen 6.
If the average distance between links is increased to 30





and the average number of links, s, is 2.5 and chosen 3.
B. THE EFFECT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PATH
Most communication networks have some processing time
associated with the links and stations. This processing time
may be the time necessary to transmit information through the
link or the time needed at station to decode, recode and re-
transmit the information. In any event, it is usually desir-
able to limit the time a message remains in the communication
network routes. Thus, instead of asking for surviving fraction
of stations that can be reached from a given station by a path
of no more than m links.
In our urn problem, the drawing of balls are equivalent to
sampling a population of n points with replacement; consequently,
the same ball may be selected more than once. A more reason-
able method of selection is to establish links sequentially.
The first station is selected equiprobably out of n possible
stations, the second station is selected equiprobably out of
the n-1 remaining stations; ... ; the s station is selected
equiprobably out of the n-s remaining stations (none of which
has been already selected)
.









+v •••» vn w ^-'i:nou
'
t re ~
placement a total of d times.
In fact, Eq. 16 is valid for infinite stations. It does
not make any difference for large ratios of population-to-sample
24

size, sampling with and without replacement. If the number
of stations is finite, Eq . 16 is not valid. Actually, Eq . 16
is a lower bound for H. This is because a communication net-
work with no parallel links in the same direction has higher
probability of being connected [4],
The probability of survival of the communication network
can be investigated without replacement for finite stations
as follows: Choose an arbitrary station v. and let S =v.
.
J 1 o 1
Let S be the set of stations connected to v. by links direc-
ted from v., .... and let S. be the set of stations connected
i ' ' l
• • •to set of stations S. , by links directed from S. ,
,l-l J i-l'
So on.
First, all links emanating from S are traced, i.e., the
number of stations in S, are found, ..., at the i stage, all
links emanating from S._, which have not already been traced,
etc .
We shall rewrite Eq. 7 in terms of another probability E(m),
which will be defined as the probability of being contacted
for the first time on the m tracing. Thus,
m-1















B(i) - B(i) ]
i=0
m














b(i) = 1-5; e(j)
t hRewrite Eq. 7-b for (m+1) stage
i=0
m
E(m+1) = [ 1 - B(m+1) ] B(i)
i=0






E(m+1) [ 1 - B(m+1) ][ 1 - I E(j) ] (22)
j =
The probability that any given station in the aggregate
is not contacted by any of these links on the (m+1) tracing
will be, for large n
26





Since the term of inside the braces of Eq. 10 is equal to
[-d E(m)], Eq. 10 becomes
B(m+1) Exp [ -d E(m) ] (23)
Substituting Eq. 23 into 22 in order to get E(m+1) in terms
of E(m) . Thus,
m
E(m+1) [ 1 - I E(j) ] {1 - Exp [ -d E(m) ]} (24)
0=0
with E(0) = 1/n
E(m) represents the probability that any station is exactly
m links removed from a station chosen at random. E(m) is ap-
proximately equal to the expected fraction of stations that are
connected by at least one path of m links and with fewer than
m links to the station picked at random.
When E(m) is known, the probability of survival of the
communication network can be figured out. If the only avail-
able path between a pair of stations is too long, it may be
considered that the enemy has effectively separated the two
stations. The probability of survival of the communication
network H does not take this factor into account. So,
H = I E(m)
m=0
In fact, if we take the sum of Eq . 24 while m goes
infinity, we have
H = 1 - Exp (-d H)





As far as the information transit time is concerned, the
determination of probability of survival of the communication
network is closely related to the path of length when any
given station is connected by a path of length m or less to a
station chosen at random. Thus,
m




with E(0)=l/n, n is the number of stations.
EXAMPLE k : A communication network has 100 stations with
an average of 20 links per station. Let 27 miles be the average
distance between pairs of links. The enemy attacks at some
area of 3000 square miles with three 5 MT . nuclear weapons.
It is desired to find the probability of survival of the com-
munication network which can be reached, after the enemy attack,
from a station chosen at random to any given station by a path
of no more than 2 links.
From Fig. 2, for r=13-5 miles
p(13.5) = 0.50
The probability of a link being in the damage area, D, is
| = 0.3025
The probability of survival of a given link inside the
area is, for one 5 MT . nuclear weapon
P(l) = 0.85




Then, from Eq. 16
H = 1 - Exp (-20 0.62 H) = 1 - Exp (-12.4 H)
The probability of survival of the communication network
H is very close to unity. However, when E(m) is calculated
from Eq. 24
E(0) = 1/100 = 0.01
E(l) = (1 - 0.01) [ 1 - Exp (-12.4 0.01) ] = 0.115
E(2) = (1 - 0.125)[ 1 - Exp (-12.4 0.115)] = 0.665
Therefore, although nearly 100 percent of the stations can be
reached from a station chosen at random, H(3) = 0.01 + 0.115
+ 0.665 = 0.79 and only 79 percent of the stations can be




A. COMPUTATION OF SURVIVABILITY BY EXACT METHOD
A communication network has n stations and m links. Each
link has a finite probability of survival; they are denoted
by P
x
, P 2 ,
..., Pm
under the states y ±> y 2 , . .., ym , respec-
tively. It is assumed that each link is associated with a
statistically independent random variable with only two pos-
sible states, namely, the state in which the link is in opera-
tion and the state in which it is not in operation.
If the link b. exists in the network with the probability
of survival p., this means that y.=l. Let the state Y. of the
entire network be described by a state vector (y, , y ? , ...,
y ) where y.=l or according to whether the link b. Is in an
operating state or not. The totality of all the 2 state
vectors forms the sample space, and each state vector corres-
ponds to a vertex of o unit m-dimensional cube. Since the
links b-. , b ? , ..., b are considered statistically independent,





( i - p, )
i-y. (27)
1=0
where p. is the probability of survival of the link b. under
state y.; and P, is the probability of the state k.
In this communication network, all links are assumed iden-







y i (1 - p)
1 y i (27. a)
1=0
A path between two stations, say, between the station v,
and v., is a subset of the links of the communication network
J
graph of the form (v~v
,




) . A "loop" in a
graph is a path with one additional ' link joining the two sta-
tions of the path. A "tree" is an n-station communication net-
work graph is a set of n-1 links that contains a path between
every pair of station in the graph. It can easily be shown
that any set of n-1 links that contains no loop is a tree.
In order to maintain communication among all stations in a
network, at least one path between any two stations of the net-
work is needed. It is well known that a finite graph is a tree
if and only If there exists exactly one path between two sta-
tions. Therefore, the communication is assured if and only if
there exists at least a tree in the network.
The probability of survival of a communication network is
defined as the probability of the communication between every
pair of its stations. So, it is the algebraic sum of the
probabilities of all the possible states which contains at
least a tree of the network. Therefore, [5]
2m
H I \ pk (28)k=l
where P, is the probability of the state k, t ' is 1 or if




EXAMPLE 5: What is the probability of survival of the
communication network which is shown in Fig. 4?
From Eqs. 27 and 28
H = P 1P 2 q 3q i| q 5 P 6 + P^q^P^ + p^q^q^ + P^P^^q^
P 1q 2P 3 q4P 5 q 6 + P 1q 2 P 3 q Z| q 5 P 6
+ P 1q 2 q 3P 1| q 5 p 6
+ p^q^p^^
p 1q2 q 3Pz| q 5 P 6
+ q 1P 2 P 3 P i| q 5 q 6
+ q 1 p 2 P 3 q 1|p 5 q6
+ q 1p 2 q 3p ij q 5 P 6
+
q 1p 2 q 3 qziP 5 P 6
+ q 1P 2 P 3 qi| q 5Pg
+ p 1P 2 P 3 q 1|q 5 P 6
+ P 1P 2 P 3 q /|P 5 q 6
+
p 1P 2 q 3 q ijP 5P 6
+ P 1P 2 q 3 P 4 q 5 P 6
+ P 1P 2 q 3 P il P 5 q 6
+ P 1q 2 P 3P ij q 5 P 6
+
p 1 q 2 q 3 Pi|P 5 P 6 + P 1 q2P 3 qzl P 5 P 6 + q 1P 2 P 3Pi4 P 5 q 6 + q 1P 2P 3 qi,P 5 P 6
+
q!P 2P 3P4q 5P6
+ PxP 2P 3P^q 5 P6
+ p 1p 2 P 3 Pi]P 5 q 6
+ p 1P 2P 3 qi]P 5P6
+
p 1q 2 P 3 Pij P 5 P 6
+ p 1 P 2 q 3 Pi4 P 5 P 6
+ q 1P 2 P 3 PijP 5 P5
+ p-^p^p^
where p. is the probability of link b., and q.=l-p., 1=1,
* • » * \J •
If p = ... = P/r } above equation becomes
H
.




B. COMPUTATION OF SURVIVABILITY BY APPROXIMATION T4ETHOD
In the exact method of calculation of the probability of
the communication network, first, all the trees in the net-
work must be found. Secondly, P that is the probability of
the state k has to be computed for all possible states. So,
if the network has a large number of stations and links,
computation takes a long time.
In this section, a finite network whose links have the
same finite probability of survival is considered. A general
method is given to compute the approximate probability of
survival of the communication network. An equivalent network
of the communication network can be used to compute the ap-
proximate probability of survival. If each link is assigned
a unit capacity, the maximum flow between any pair of stations
is equal to the corresponding mim-cutset, which must be re-
moved in order to separate these stations.
1 . Equivalent Network
The network flow problem was first considered by Ford
and Fulkerson [10] who introduced the basic concepts of flow,
cut, etc., and provided the main tool, the maximum-flow
minimum-cut theorem. Ford and Fulkerson discussed the flow
between two special points, the source and the sink. Gomory
and Hu [9] studied the problem of multi-terminal flow and sug-
gested the use of the equivalent network which has the same
flow of the original network.
The construction of Gomory and Hu is described as
follows: Select two nodes arbitrarily and solve a maximal
33

flow problem between them. This locates a minimal cut (X,X),
which we represent symbolically by two nodes connected by a




In one node, the individual nodes of X are listed; in the
other, those of X. Next, choose two nodes in X, and solve
the resulting maximal flow problem in the X-condensed net-
work, i.e., all the nodes of X can be shown as a single node.
The resulting minimal cut has capacity e
?
and is represented
by a link of this capacity connecting the two parts into which
X is divided by the cut, say X-. and X? . The node X is con-
nected to X, if it is in the same part of the cut as X-, ; to








This process discussed above is continued, and at
each stage of the construction some set Y, consisting of more
than one node, is chosen from the tree diagram at that stage.
The set Y will have a certain number of links connected to
it in this tree. All of the sets that can be reached from Y
by paths using one of these links are condensed into a single
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node for the next maximal flow problem. This is done for
each link connected to Y in the tree. In the resulting net-
work a maximal flow problem is solved between two nodes of Y.
The set Y is partitioned into Y, and Y p by the minimal cut
thus found; this is represented in the new tree by a link
having capacity equal to the cut capacity joining Y-. and Y •
the other nodes of the old tree are connected to Y, if they
are in the Y-, part of the cut; to Y„ otherwise.
To illustrate the general step of the construction,
suppose that we have arrived at the tree diagram of Fig. 7,
with Y to be spilt. Removal of the 'links connected to Y leaves
the connected components Y; X ; X„, X ; Xl, Xj- , X^ . Then in
the original network the nodes X, are condensed, as are those
X
2











Solving a maximal flow problem between two nodes of
Y' in the condensed network might then lead to the new tree,








The process is repeated until all the sets consist of one
node each. If the original network has n nodes, this point
is reached after n-1 maximal flow problems have been solved,
since the final diagram is a tree on n nodes, each link of
which has been created by solving a flow problem. The number




To begin the analysis for the network of Fig. 9, arbi-
trarily select node 1 and 6 for the first flow problem. This
yields the cutset ( {1,3}
,
{2,^,5,6} ) represented by the





Taking 1 and 3 for the next flow problem and con-




( {1} , (3,4,5,6,2} ). Hence the tree of Fig. 10 becomes
^ 3 2,4,5,6
Figure 12
Next choose 2 and 4 the condensed network is shown in




Hence the tree of Fig. 12 becomes
d> <3^-<lM>^—<7)
Figure 14
Selecting 2 and 5 for the next flow problem and con-
densing yields Fig. 15 with the cutset ( (5) , {1,2,3,4,6} )
Figure- 15
Thus the tree diagram at this stage is as shown in Fig. 16
(!>-M!H-(ID •©
Figure 16
Finally choose 2 and 6 to get the condensed network












2 . Computation of Approximated Value of Survivability
Let an equivalent network be a tree with n nodes and
n-1 links. Each link has a capacity denoted by e., where
i=l , 2 , . . . ,n-l . The tree links with capacity e. can be repre-
sented by e. parallel links with unit capacity. As discussed
in the previous section, e. is always an integer. So, the
network of Fig. 8 can be redrawn as in Fig. 19, in which the
total number of links between Y
? and X-. is e^, ..., Xj. and
X^ is equal to e ^
.
The probability of survival between two nodes, say,




the same probability of survival. Then,
g(6) = 1 - (1-p) (1-p) . . . (1-p)
1 - q (29)
where g(i) is the probability of survival between two nodes
with link capacity e..
In general,
g(i) = 1 - q l (29- a)
where q=l-p .
'
The network of Fig. 19 could be redrawn as in Fig. 20





The probability of survival of the network of Fig,
20 can easily be computed as follows:
H = g(l) g(2) g(3) g(*0 g(5) g(6) g(7)
For n-node network




Substituting Eq. 29 -a into 30, we have
n-1





The exact and approximation probability of six dif-
ferent finite networks are computed for different probability
of survival of the links using Eqs . 28 and 31, respectively.
They are shown in Appendix A. The tables for these computa-
tions are shown in Appendix B.
All of the six figures have some similar character-
istics. The approximated value is always greater than the
exact value for any value of p. Equation 31 is a reasonable
approximation for computing the probability of survival of the
network, because the approximation is about equal to the exact
value when p <_ 0.20 and p >_ 0.80. The average maximum error
is only 3-2 percent when p is in this region. The average
maximum error for these networks occurs at p = 0.55, and it is
equal to 8 percent, as shown in Appendix B.
Using modified equivalent network, the probability of
survival of the network can be calculated as before. The
modified equivalent of the communication network might be ob-
tained as follows: Follow the same procedure used in getting
the equivalent network. If the original network has n nodes,
solve n-1 maximal flow problems, since the final diagram is a
tree with n nodes. The k link has the capacity e, . Draw
the tree that links with capacity e, between nodes X, and
X, ., . Represent the tree links by e, parallel links with
unity capacities. Remove one link between nodes X. and X.,, 3
where e. is maximum in e, k=l ,2 , • • • ,n-l . The final diagram




Assume e,- is the maximum integer in e, , k = l ,2 , . . . ,6 .
The modified equivalent of Pig. 8 can be drawn as in Fig. 21.
The survivability of Fig. 21 is
H = g(l) g(2) g(3) g(*0 g'(5) g(6) g(7)











(1 - q ) (32)
k=l





Equation 32 gives better approximation for computation
of the probability of survival of the network. It can easily
be seen in Appendix B, the average maximum error is only 3.2
percent instead of 8 percent. Also for small p, say p < 0.50,




If the number of stations in a random communication net-
work is extremely large, then the first method (Eq. 16) is
best of the four methods for computing the probability of
survival. In Eq. 16, the path of length is not considered
important. It gives a lower bound for the probability of
survival of the communication networks.
When the path of length is a major factor, the second meth-
od (Eq. 26) results in a better computation of survivability.
The third and fourth methods (Eqs. 31 and 32, respectively)
are approximations of the survivability of finite networks.
The third method is based on the equivalent network which
utilizes the min-cut maximum-flow theorem and has been applied
to the computation of survivability of six networks. The re-
sults are reasonable, I.e., the average maximum error between
the exact method and this approximation is 8 percent. The
fourth method is based on the modified equivalent network
which also utilizes the min-cut maximum-flow theorem. Again
this method Is applied to the same six networks, however, the
results are significantly improved.
Some suggestions for further studies are given below.
For random networks:
1. Systems with nonuniform links and distance bias,
2. Systems with repair and memory.
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For finite network: Methods three and four are applied
only to six simple networks.
1. They may be applied to more complex networks in order to
compare which method is best approximation.
The computation of survivability is based on the identical
probability of survival of links.
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P - Probability of Survival of the Link
Figure A-l. Simulation of the Probability of Survival of
Network One.
Solid line represents the exact value, cross and plus sign





P - Probability of Survival of the Link
Figure A-2 . Simulation of the Probability of Survival
of Network Two.
Solid line represents the exact value, cross and plus sign


























P - Probability of Survival of the Link
Figure A-3. Simulation of the Probability of Survival
of Network Three.
Solid line represents the exact value, cross and plus sign





P - Probability of Survival of the Link
Figure A-4. Simulation of the Probability of Survival
of Network Pour.
Solid line represents the exact value, cross and plus sign



















P - Probability of Survival of the Link
Figure A-5
.
Simulation of the Probability of Survival
of Network Five.
Solid line represents the exact value, cross and plus sign





P - Probability of Survival of the Link
Figure A-6 . Simulation of the Probability of Survival
of Network Six.
Solid line represents the exact value, cross and plus sign




















P - Probability, of Survival of the Link
Figure B-l
Simulation of the average errors between the exact method
and approximations methods.





TABLES OF COMPUTATION OP SURVIVABILITY
Table B - 1
Network One Ne;twork Two
Link
Prob. Eq. 28 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 28 Eq. 31 Eq. 32
0.05 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.10 0.007 0.010 0.00 7 0.004 0.007 0.004
0.15 0.022 0.030 0.021 0.012 0.021 0.012
0.20 0.048 0.063 0.04 7 0.027 0.047 0.026
0.25 0.086 0.111 0.084 0.051 0.084 0.048
0.30 0.137 0.171 0.133 0.084 0.133 0.078
0.35 0.199 0.242 0.193 0.126 0.193 0.117
0.40 0.271 0.321 0.262 0.179 0.262 0.164
0.45 0.352 0.406 0.339 0.241 0.339 0.219
0.50 0.437 0.492 0.422 0.312 0.422 0.281
0.55 0.526 0.578 0.507 0.391 0.507 0.350
0.60 0.613 0.660 0.593 0.475 0.593 0.423
0.65 0.698 0.737 Q.676 0.563 O.676 0.501
0.7Q 0.775 0.806 0.754 0.652 0.754 0.580
0.75 0.844 0.865 0.824 0.738 0.824 0.659
0.80 0.901 0.914 0.885 0.819 0.885 0.737
0.85 0.946 0.952 0.934 0.890 0.934 0.812
0.90 0.977 0.979 0.970 0.948 0.970 0.882
0.95 0.995 0.995 0.993 O.986 0.993 0.945
1.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table B - 2
Network Three Network Four
Link
Prob. Eq. 28 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 28 Eq. 31 Eq. 32
0.05 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
0.10 0.013 0.020 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.010
0.15 0.039 0.057 0.041 0.032 0.041 0.030
0.20 0.082 0.116 0.086 0.068 0.086 0.063
0.25 0.143 0.193 0.146 0.119 0.146 0.111
0.30 0.219 0.284 0.220 0.183 0.220 0.171
0.35 0.306 0.382 0.304 0.258 0.304 0.242
.40 0. 400 0.482 0.393 0.340 0.393 0.321
0.45 0.498 0.579 0.485 0.428 0.485 0.406
0.50 0.594 0.670 0.574 0.516 0.574 0.492
0.55 0.684 0.751 0.659 0.602 0.659 0.578
0.60 0.766 0.820 0.736 0.683 0.736 0.660
0.65 0.835 0.877 0.804 0.756 0.804 0.737
0.70 0.892 0.921 0.862 0.821 0.862 0.806
0.75 0.936 0.95 4 0.908 0.877 O.98O 0.865
0.80 0.967 0.976 0.945 0.922 0.945 0.914
0.85 O.986 0.990 0.971 0.956 0.971 0.952
0.90 0.996 0.997 0.988 O.98I 0.988 0.979
0.95 0.999 1.000 0.997 0.995 0.997 0.995
1.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table B - 3
Ne-bwork Five Ne twork Six
Link
Prob. Eq. 28 Eq. 31 Eq. 32 Eq. 28 Eq. 31 Eq. 32
0.05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.10 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003
0.15 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.016 .011
0.20 0.007 0.017 0.009 0.031 0.042 0.031
0.25 0.016 0.037 0.021 0.066 0.085 0.064
0.30 0.031 0.068 0.040 0.118 0.145 0.112
0.35 0.054 0.111 O.O67 0.186 0.220 0.175
0.40 0.087 0.168 0.105 0.269 0.308 0.252
0.45 0.131 0.237 0.153 0.362 0.404 0.338
0.50 0.187 0.316 0.211 0.461 0.502 0.431
0.55 0.256 0.405 0.279 0.559 0.599 0.525
0.60 0.337 0.498 0.356 0.650 0.689 0.618
0.65 0.428 0.593 0.439 0.730 0.769 0.705
0.70 0.528 0.686 0.527 0.795 0.838 0.784
0.75 0.633 0.772 0.618 0.845 0.89 4 0.852
0. 80 0.737 0.849 0.70 8 0.881 0.937 0.907
0.85 0.835 0.913 0.794 0.908 0.968 0.949
0.90 0.919 0.961 0.873 0.931 O.987 0.978
0.95 0.977 0.990 0.943 0.959 0.997 0.995
1.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Table B - 4
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